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Abstract 
Consider the class of n-stage decision models with state space S, action space A, and payoff 
function g : (S x A)” x S + R. The function g is Markov-achievable if for any possible set 
of available randomized actions and all transition laws, each plan has a corresponding Markov 
plan whose value is at least as good. A condition on g, called the “non-forking linear sections 
property”, is necessary and sufficient for g to be Markov achievable. If g satisfies the slightly 
stronger “general linear sections property”, then g can be written as a sum of products of certain 
simple neighboring-stage payoffs. @ 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
AMS classifications: primary 9OC40; secondary 60G40, 60Kl5, 9OC39 
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1. Introduction and framework 
A fundamental question in the study of Markov decision models asks under what 
conditions it is optimal, or at least nearly optimal, to use a Markov selection rule at 
each stage. It is well known that this question has different answers depending on what 
optimality criterion (payoff function) is being used. Thus, it is natural to ask which 
payoff functions g will always lead to the existence of good Markov selection rules at 
each stage of a finite-stage decision problem. 
Here is an informal description of the results to be obtained in this note (more 
precise definitions and statements will follow later): Let S and A be the state and 
action spaces. We say that a real-valued payoff function g with domain (S x A)” x S is 
Markov-achievable if for every possible set of available randomized actions and every 
possible transition law p, and each plan rc, there is a Markov plan 72 such that the 
average of g under 72 is at least that under n. Assuming that the action space has 
at least three elements, we establish a condition on g, called the “non-forking linear 
sections property”, which is necessary and sufficient for g to be Markov-achievable. 
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We also give a slightly-stronger condition, the “general linear sections property”, and 
show that each g having this property can be written as a sum of certain products 
involving functions of states and actions which are neighboring in time. 
We now begin by giving a formal definition of the model. 
Definition 1.1. Suppose n is a positive integer. An n-stage decision model is a five-tuple 
(SJ, 9, P, g), where 
(1) the state space S is a non-empty, countable set; 
(2) the action space A is a non-empty, countable set; 
(3) the randomized action map 9 assigns to each s in S and each k (1 <k <n) a 
non-empty countable subset J!(s, k) of the set of probability measures on the subsets 
of A. The set 5!(s, k) is the set of available randomized actions at state s and 
time k; 
(4) the transition lawp associates with each s, each k, and each a in A a probability 
measure p(.Js, k, a) on the subsets of S; 
(5) the payoffunction g is a bounded mapping from the set (S x A)” x S of histories 
of length n to the set R of real numbers. 
At time 0, the system begins at state SO which is chosen from S according to some 
initial distribution PO. Then action al is chosen using a measure in ~(so, l), and the sys- 
tem moves to state ~1, where si is selected according to the transition law p(.jso, 1,al). 
Next, action a2, chosen with a measure from Z?(si,2), causes a move to ~2, where s2 
is selected according to p(.ls1,2,a2). The procedure continues until time n, when the 
state s, is reached. The payoff received for this procedure is g(soalsla2 . . s,_la,s,). 
The collections of histories are denoted by HO = S and by 
& := (s x A)k x s (1 dkdn), 
so that the payoff function g has domain H,,. The sequence of rules for selecting the 
actions in the decision process described above is called a plan. Thus, a plan rc = 
(711,x2,..., zn) is a sequence of selection rules 
,‘tk : Hk_, + %(s,k). 
If a plan rc is paired with an initial distribution po on the subsets of S, then a 
probability measure Pn,pO is induced on H, so that for each soalsla2.. .s,_la,,s, in H,, 
Pn,po({s0als~a2 . . ‘sn)) = Po({~o})~p(~k~~k-,,k,~k~~k(~oa~ . ..sk-l)((ak)). 
k=l 
For 1 <k <n, a selection rule zk is Markov if for each q = soalsl . ’ . a& in & 
and each q’ = sbais{ . . aks6 in Hk, we have r&(q) = r&(9’) whenever Sk = sk. A plan 
n is time-[k,n]Markov if the selection rules zk, r&+1,. . . , rc, are Markov. A plan rc is 
a Markov plan if it is time-[ l,n] Markov. Notice that for a Markov plan, the action 
which rc takes at state s and time j depends only on s and j and not on any previous 
states visited or previous actions taken. 
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Definition 1.2. The function g : H, --+ R is Murkou-achievable if for every mapping A! 
and every transition law p which make (,%A,_??, p,g) an n-stage decision model, and 
for each initial distribution po and each plan rc, there is a Markov plan 72 such that 
(1.1) 
In Eq. (1.1) we have written the measures PQ,~ and Pn,po without the qualifier “PO”. 
In what follows, we will continue to suppress the “PO” whenever there is no ambiguity. 
Dynkin and Yushkevich (1979) give a systematic treatment of the theory of Markov 
decision processes, both on finite and infinite time intervals. They establish the suffi- 
ciency of Markov plans for a large class of models. Feinberg (1982) demonstrates the 
sufficiency of Markov plans for models where payoff functions satisfy certain very gen- 
eral criteria. Larson and Casti (1978) illustrate some dynamic programming reward cri- 
teria which have the “Markovian property”, a notion similar to our “Markov-achievable 
payoff function”. Hill and Pestien (1987) identify a collection of payoff functions which 
turn out to be Markov-achievable. 
Pioneering work on finite-stage Markov decision models was done by Bellman, 
(1957). Fundamental results for related dynamic programming problems were estab- 
lished by Blackwell (1965). The work by Hinderer (1970) provides a careful history 
of the development of decision processes and uses a broad model in which payoffs 
may depend on the entire history of the process. Schll and Sudderth (1987) prove the 
uniform adequacy of Markov plans for a wide-ranging model which includes the usual 
dynamic programming payoff as well as others. The text by White (1993) gives ex- 
cellent insight and a wealth of examples and exercises about Markov decision models. 
2. Examples and the general linear sections property 
We begin this section with two very simple examples of functions which fail to be 
Markov-achievable. The reasoning underlying these examples will be generalized as 
part of a proof in the latter half of Section (4). 
Example 2.1. Let S have only one element, denoted by “t”, let A = {a, b}, and let 
n = 2. Define g on Hz by 
dta t at> = dtb t bt) = 1 
and 
(So the payoff is 1 if the actions used at times 1 and 2 are the same, and the payoff 
is 0 otherwise.) Let Q(t, 1) contain only the measure that gives probability i to {u} 
and : to {b}. Let Q(t,2) contain all probability measures on subsets of A. If the plan 
rZ is Markov, then the measures ti(tat) and Z(tbt) must be the same, and therefore 
J gdPe = 1. 
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However, suppose rr is a plan involving the non-Markov selection rule 74 for which 
~2(td)({aI> = n2(vt)({bI) = 1. 
Since P, lives on the two histories ta t at and tb t bt, we have 
s gdP, = 1. 
Thus, g is not Markov-achievable. 
Example 2.2. Let S = {t}, let A = {a, b,c}, and let n = 2. Define g on H2 by 
scta t 4) = g(V t 4) = g(tb t btl = 1 
and g(h) = 0 otherwise. Again let Q(t, 1) contain only the measure that gives prob- 
ability i to {u} and i to {b}. This time let Q(t,2) = {p,v}, where v({b}) = 1 
and 
PL({Ul) = PL({Cl) = $. 
It is easy to see that for any Markov plan 2, 
s gdP$ = ;. 
On the other hand, if z involves any non-Markov selection rule 712 for which 
ndtbt) = v and m(tat) = P, 
then 
P,(ta tat) = P,(tu t ct) = l/4 and P,(V t 4.1 = ;. 
Hence, 
and g is not Markov-achievable. 
Definition 2.3. A collection of points (not necessarily distinct) in R2 is strongly 
colineur if all of the points coincide or if all of the points lie on the same straight 
line and that line either is horizontal, is vertical, or has positive slope. (Thus, lines of 
negative slope are disallowed.) 
Lemma 2.4. Zf threepoints (q,s~), (Q,s~), and (Q,s~) in R2 are not strongly collinear, 
then there exists a real number 5 such that 0 < [ < 1 and for some ordering (i, j, k) 
ofw,3), 
&+(I-()-Sk-Sj 
(ri + (1 - r)rk -rj 
< 0. (2.1) 
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Proof. If the three non-strongly collinear points are distinct, and if they can be arranged 
so that for some ordering (i,j,k) of (1,2,3) 
r, d rj <Q and si<sjdsk, 
then for some 5 in (0, l), the slope of the line through 
(& + (1 - t>rk, 5s; f (1 - <)Sk) and (rj,sj> 
is negative and so Eq. (2.1) holds. If the points cannot be so arranged, or if two of 
the points coincide, then a line through some pair of points has negative slope, and 
we can take r = 1 in Eq. (2.1). 0 
Definition 2.5. The payoff function 9 : H, + R has the general linear sections property 
(GLSP) if for each s in S, each k (16 k d n - I), each q’ in (S x ,4)k and each q” in 
(S x ,4)k, the set 
{(g(q’sw),g(q”sw)): w E (A x syk> (2.2) 
is strongly collinear. 
To see how the definition of GLSP fits Examples 2.1 and 2.2, let s = 1, let q’ = ta, 
and let q” = tb. Then in Example 2.1 
{(s(ta t W>>dW t w>>: w E ‘4 x q = {(LO),(O, l>>, 
a set which is not strongly collinear, while in Example 2.2, 
{Ml-at w)>dtb t WI ): w E A x q = ((13 l),(O, l)>(O,O)), 
another non-strongly-collinear set. Thus, neither of the functions g has the GLSP. 
In the third example of this section, we describe a classical payoff function which 
is known to be Markov-achievable: 
Example 2.6. As in the classical dynamic programming setup, let 
g(~Oai~l~‘~%~n)=~ u(si-l,Qi,si), 
!=I 
where the “utility function” u : S xA x S + R is bounded. If q’ E (SXA)~, q” E (SXA)~, 
and s* E S, then all points in the set 
{(g(q’s*w),g(q”s*w)) : w E (A x sp} 
lie on the same straight line of slope 1. To see this, notice that if w’ = a~+,~~+, 
a; and W” = a;+,.$‘+, . . at, then 
g(q”s*w”) - g(q”s*w’) = 2 u(si’_,,a~,S;‘) - 2 u(s(_,,u(,s~) 
i=k+l r=k+l 
= g(q’s*W”) - g(q’s”w’), 
where si and sb both denote s*. Therefore, g has the GLSP. 
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It will follow from later results that if g has the GLSP, then g must be Markov- 
achievable. However, the converse turns out not to be true. Thus, in order to obtain 
a condition equivalent to Markov achievability, we must formulate a stricter type of 
linear sections property. 
3. Non-forking paths and the NFLSP 
The chief theorem, to be stated later in this section, will use the notion of “non- 
forking” paths and the non-forking linear sections property. 
Definition 3.1. Let w E (A x S)m and J$ E (A x S)“‘, where w = al.sl . .s, and Q = 
a^l& . . . i,,,. Then w and 6 are non-f&king paths if, whenever sg = & for some 
6’ (164 <m), we also have aj = 6j and Sj = ;j for all j such that e < j <m. 
Thus, w and $ are non-forking paths if, having agreed at some state, they agree at 
all actions and states that follow. Notice that even if w and + never agree, they are 
still called non-forking. Three paths w,;, and 4 are non-forking if each pair w and 
6,~ and 6, and JC and i6 is non-forking. 
Definition 3.2. The payoff function g : H,, -+ R has the non-forking linear sections 
property (NFLSP) if for each s in S, each k (1 d k <n - l), each q’ in (S x A)k and 
each q” in (S x A)k, and for any three non-forking paths w’,w’, and w3 in (A x S)nek 
whose initial actions are all distinct, the points 
(g(q’sw’),g(q”sw’)), i = 1,2,3 
are strongly collinear. 
The following proposition is obvious from Definitions 2.5 and 3.2: 
Proposition 3.3. Zf g : H,, + R has the general linear sections property, then g has 
the non-forking linear sections property. 
Here are some examples illustrating the NFLSP: 
Example 3.4. Let S = { 1,2,. . .} and suppose A contains at least the three distinct 
actions a, b, and c. For soalsl . a,s, in H,,, let 
g(so~lsl . .u,s,) = max{s0,sl,...,s,) 
Thus, the payoff g for any path is the maximum value among all states visited, regard- 
less of actions taken. Then g does not have the NFLSP. To show this, in the notation 
of Definition 3.2 let s = 1 and suppose q’ visits only the “1” state and q” visits only 
the “2” state, while w1 always uses action a and visits only “l”, w2 uses b and visits 
only “2”, and w3 uses c and visits only “3”. Then w1 and w2 and w3 are non-forking, 
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and the following set is not strongly collinear: 
{(s(4’sw’ ), g(q”Sw’ )), (9(4’sw2 ), s(q”Sw*))? (9(4’sw3 )? g(q”Sw3 ))> 
= {(1,2),(2,2),(3,3)}. 
Thus, g does not have the NFLSP. 
Example 3.5. Let S = {t}, A = {a,b,c}, and n = 3. Define g on H3 by 
g(h) = 
1 if h uses the action a at least twice, 
0 otherwise. 
It is easy to check that the NFLSP holds. Also, it is intuitively clear that g is 
Markov-achievable, because for any randomized action map 2, a good Markov plan 
can be obtained by always choosing (at the single state t) those randomized actions 
which make the probability of {u} large. But g does not have the GLSP because, in 
the notation of Definition 2.5, if q’ = tat, q” = jbt, w’ = a t at, w* = a t bt, and 
w3 = h t bt, then 
{(8(4’~~Wl), .q(q”Sw’ ))> (8(4’SW2 )? CJ(q”Sw*))> (g(q’sw3 )7 .y(q”Sw3 ))I 
= {(l,l),(l,O),(O,O)}, (3.1) 
a set which is not strongly collinear. 
However, notice that we can modify the previous example slightly to obtain a g 
which does not satisfy the NFLSP: 
Example 3.6. In Example 3.5, suppose instead that S has at least three elements 
s, U, and v, but that A,g, and 12 remain the same. In the notation of Definition 3.2, 
let q’ = sus,q” = sbs,w’ = usus,w2 = buus, and w’ = cubs. Then the paths w’, w2, 
and w3 are non-forking, but the set described in Eq. (3.1) is not strongly collinear. 
Thus, g does not have the NFLSP. 
We are now prepared to state the main theorem of this paper. The proof will be 
given in the next section. 
Theorem 3.7. Suppose A and S are countable sets with IAl 33 and S non-empty, and 
suppose 
g:(SxA)“xS+R. 
Then g hus the non-forking linear sections property if und only if g is Murkov- 
uchievuble. 
In Pestien and Wang (1993), somewhat-related questions were studied for a finite- 
horizon payoff function which depended only on the states visited, not on the actions 
taken. A “linear sections property” was formulated there and was shown to be sufficient 
for “Markov adequacy”. (A function g on S” has the Markov adequacy property if 
every strategy has a corresponding Markov strategy which gives g the same integral 
as the original strategy.) The same paper also showed that the linear sections property 
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was necessary for Markov adequacy, but unfortunately only under the very restrictive 
hypothesis that g be permutation invariant. 
The formulation in Pestien and Wang (1993) follows closely the gambling-theoretic 
framework of Dubins and Savage (1976), while the formulation in the current note is 
closer to the dynamic programming setup of Blackwell (1965) and others. It is possible 
to define a correspondence between gambling problems and dynamic programming 
problems, but there is no nice pairing between Markov plans in the one framework 
and those in the other. An extensive discussion of gambling problems and of their 
relations to dynamic programming is given in the recent book by Maitra and Sudderth 
(1996, Ch. 3). 
The following two technical lemmas give necessary conditions for a payoff function g 
to have the non-forking linear sections property. To introduce notation for the lemmas, 
if q E (S x A)k, s E S, and a E A, let gqsa denote the function defined on Hn_k_, by 
gqsa(h) = S(@r). 
For abbreviation, let 
{qs-} = {qsw: w E (A x S)“_k) 
and 
{qsa-} = {qsav: u E Hn_k-,}. 
We say qs (resp. qsa) is feasible under a plan x if 
Pz({qs-1) ’ 0 (resp. P7[({qsu-}) > 0). 
Lemma 3.8. Let g : H,, 4 R be a puyoflfunction and let 16 k <n - 1. Suppose there 
exist q in (S x A)k,G in (S x A)k,s in S, distinct actions a’,u2, and u3 in A, and there 
exists an initial distribution pi and a time-[k + 2,n] Murkov plan 71 such that the 
points Ql, Q2, and Q3, are not strongly collinear, where 
Qi = 
( 
/ 
H”_-k&l 
.qqsai dPnTi”_km, q+ dP, , 
) 
i = 1,2,3 
and qsu’ and @sui are feasible under rc. Then the function g does not have the non- 
forking linear sections property. 
Note: In the extreme case where k = n - 1, we regard any plan n as being time- 
[n + 1, n] Markov. 
Proof. For each i, define &(.) = p(.Is, k+l,u’). Since Qi, Q2, and Qs are averages of a 
fixed set of points with respect to the probability measures ,u& & and & respectively, 
we can find states s’, s2, and s3 such that if 
Qi = ( iAxSy_k_, gqsa’s’ uC>lAxsi_k_, gNs’ dpn> ’ i = 1,2,3 
and qsa’s’ and &a’s’ are feasible under z, then Q,, e2, and Q3 are not strongly collinear. 
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If k = n - 1, then a’s’, a2s2, and a3s3 are the desired non-forking paths. Otherwise, 
there are now three cases to consider: 
Case 1: s’ = s2 = s3 (call the common value s*). Since the plan rt is Markov and 
always begins at the same state, each point Qi, Q2, and Q, is an average with respect 
to the same probability measure induced by the plan 71. Therefore, there exists u in 
(A x S)“-k-’ such that qsa’s*v and qsa’s*o are feasible under 7t and such that the 
points 
Q* = (y(qsa’s*v),g(qsa’s*v)), i = 1,2,3 
are not strongly collinear. Then W’ = a’s*v and w2 = a2s*v and w3 = a3s*u are the 
desired non-forking paths. 
Case 2: Exactly two of s’,s2, and s3 are equal (say s* := s’ = s2). Then we can 
find states S and s and non-strongly collinear points Ql, h2, and Q,, where 
qsa’s*Fs and qsa’s*E are feasible under n, and 
where qsa3s3Z and @a3s3E are feasible under n. 
If S = s, then we can find v’ in (A x S)“-k-’ such that qsa’s* ZFV’ and @a’s*& 
(i = 1,2) and q 3 3= sa s asv’ and qsa3s3% are feasible under n and such that the points 
(g(qsa’s*Zsv’),g(qsa’s*?Ev’)), (g(qsa2s*Fsu’),g(qsa2s*Fsv’)), 
and 
(g(qsa3s3 %u’), g(qsa3s3 &I’)) 
are not strongly collinear. 
If S # j, then continue the procedure until agreeing states are found and thus non- 
forking paths are identified. If no agreeing states are ever found, then the appropriate 
paths remain non-forking. 
Case 3: All of s’, s2, and s3 are different. Then we can find non-strongly collinear 
points Q,, fi2, and Q3, where 
“i=(J qsn’sw dpn, 
J 
~~ssaw~~ dp, > 
> 
i = 1,2,3 
(AxS)“-k-2 (AxS)“-“-’ 
and qsa’&?iS’ and @a’&‘? are feasible under n. Then either all of F’,S’, and 53 are 
the same, or exactly two are the same, or all are different. In any of these subcases, 
we can proceed as above to eventually identify the appropriate non-forking paths. 0 
Lemma 3.9. Suppose g : H,, 4 R has the non-forking linear sections property. Then 
for each k (1 <k <n - 1) and each time-[n - k + 2, n] Markov plan n, there exist 
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bounded mappings tl,_k : Hn-k + [O,oo), Pn-k : Ha-k + [w, and Yn-k : f& + [w 
such that for each q in (S x Ayek, each s in S and each a in A, 
s 
gqsa dPz = &s-k@) 
s 
h-k ha fl, + Pn-k(qS>. 
ffk-I Hh-I 
Proof. Use the contrapositive of the previous lemma and put the straight line in 
slope-intercept form. 0 
4. The NFLSP and Markov-achievability 
In this section we develop the proof of Theorem 3.7. First, we state an easy lemma 
which will be used below: 
Lemma 4.1. Let {rl,r2,.. } be a bounded sequence of real numbers and {cl, ~2,. . .} 
be a sequence of non-negative real numbers with Cr, ci < 00. Then there exists a 
real number r in {r,, r2,. . .} such that 
r2 Ci2 9 cjrj. 
i=l i=l 
Proof that NFLSP implies Markov achievability. Let ($A,$ p,g) be an n-stage 
decision model with initial distribution PO. Given the plan rc, we will refine the standard 
algorithm of backward induction to build a sequence of plans r&O), r&i), . . . , dnpl) such 
that for each j, rc u) is time-[n - j + 1, n] Markov and 
(4.1) 
Then, after constructing the sequence, we will let 72 = r&‘), which is the desired 
Markov plan. 
To begin (step 0), let rc co) be the plan rc. As in the note following Lemma 3.8, r&O) 
is regarded as being time-[n + 1, n] Markov. For the mth step (1 <m <n - 1 ), suppose 
from step m - 1 we have a time-[n - m + 2,n] Markov plan rc@-‘) such that 
J g dP,cm- I I b J gdpn. 
If g has the non-forking linear sections property, then by Lemma 3.9, we have mappings 
a,_, : H+,,, + [O,W), Pn_m : H,,_, -+ R, and y,,-,,, : H, -+ R such that for each q 
in (S x A)“+, each s in S, and each a in A such that qsa is feasible under rc@-‘), 
I 
gqsa df’,(m-l) = an-m(qs) J (yn-m)sadP~m-l) + Pn-m(qS>. (4.2) WI-1 H m I 
Fix s in S. If qs is feasible under #-‘), let 
,(m-1) = c P,Cm-I)({qSW}) P 
wE(A xS)m P~~,-l,({qs-})y”-“(sw)~ 
(4.3) 
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We can think of F$-” as the conditional expected value of Y,_,(P) under the plan 
I@‘), given that the history qs has occurred. We wish to make ynPm(~--) as large 
as possible when at state s at time n - m. To do so, we will use a randomized 
action which had arisen under plan n @-‘) from a history q*s which made rCrn-” q*.* 
large. 
Now, for any q in (S x A)“-m, let 
c’m-‘) = P,,“,-,,({qS-})cc,_,(qS) 4J 
and notice that each cg-” is non-negative, 
c $-‘) < 00, 
qE(SxA)“-” 
and the set {$-I’: qE(SxA)“-“} b is ounded. Then by Lemma 4.1, there exists q* 
in (S x A>,-“’ such that q*s is feasible for rc(“-‘) and 
Cm-‘) rq*, c cg-“3 c [c$-“$“]. (4.4) 
qE(SxA)“m”’ qE(SxA)“-“’ 
Thus, for each s in S, we have identified a particular history q*s which leads to a large 
payoff under n @-‘) Hence, we will arrange the Markov selection rule R?‘~+, so that . 
n,_,+’ 4s a wa (m) ( ) 1 Y s uses n,_,+’ 4 (m-” ( *s), regardless of q. That is, define the time-[n - m + 
1, n] Markov plan rc@) as follows: 
rclrm_)m+‘(qs) = rc:;:)‘(q*s) if q E (S x A)n-m (4.5) 
and 
no’ = 7$+‘)(h) if hEHk_1 and k#n-m+l. 
By Eq. (4.6), for each q in (S x A)“-“, 
(4.6) 
P,cm,({qs-}) = P,,m-u({qs-}). (4.7) 
Thus, we have, for each s in S, 
qE(SxA)“-“’ 
where the sums are taken over only those q such that qs is feasible under r@‘) and 
where the last equality uses relations given by Eqs. (4.7) and (4.5). Then because of 
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Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) the expression becomes 
P,c,-1,({qs-})cc,_,(qs) r$;l) 
qE(SxA)“-” 1 
2 
qE(SxA)"-m 
Let 
D,“-” = {s~u~q . . . a,s, : s,_~ = s}. 
The calculation above has shown that 
s 
an-m~n-m dP,(m) 2 
s 
an-myn-m dPn(m-l). 
g-m D,“_” 
(4.8) 
(In writing the preceding integrals, we have extended the domain of CI,_,,, and ynprn 
to all of H,, in the obvious way.) And since /In-,,,, considered as a function on H,,, is 
constant on the rightmost factors (A x S)“, we have 
J Pn-m dp,cm, 3 J /Gem dP,cm-I). OF-” D:-” (4.9) 
Because of Eqs. (4.8) (4.9) and (4.2) we get 
J. 9 @z(m) > J gdPncm-1,. D:-” D:-” 
Finally, take the sum over all s in S in Eq. (4.10) to get 
/gdp+, > /gdi+li > Jgti,. 
(4.10) 
We proceed as far as step II - 1 and obtain a plan rr(n-1) where, by construction, each 
of the selection rules r~f-~), . . . , n, @-‘) is Markov, and where the selection rule r$-‘) 
is automatically Markov. Thus, we get the intended Markov plan 72 for Eq. (1.1) by 
setting 72 = r#-‘). 0 
Corollary 4.2. Under the hypotheses of the theorem, if there exists an optimal plan, 
then there exists an optimal Markov plan. 
The argument above is an extension and modification of the backward induction al- 
gorithm which originated with Bellman’s principle of optimality (Bellman, 1957). This 
principle was used by Blackwell (1964) to obtain good Markov plans in finite-stage 
dynamic programming. The broad and thorough study by Puterman (1994) presents 
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several interesting examples of how the backward induction algorithm is applied in 
specific finite-horizon Markov decision problems. 
Proof that Markov-achievability implies NFLSP. Suppose g : H,, + R does not have 
the non-forking linear sections property. To show that g does not have the NFLSP, we 
will generalize the reasoning of Example 2.2. Because of Lemma 2.4 there exist s*ES, 
q’ = s$\s’, . ($ and q” = $,‘a~$’ . . ai in (S x A)“, and there exist non-forking paths 
w’,w’, and w3, in (A x S)“-“, where 
w’ = a;+,$+, . . a:$ for i = 1,2,3 
and a:,,, a:,,, and ai+1 are distinct, such that for some real number [ with 0 < 5 6 1, 
[g(q”S*W1) + (1 - <)g(q”S*W3) - g(q”S*W2) < o 
tg(q’s*w’) + (1 - t)g(q’s*w3) - g(q’s*wZ) . 
We must show that there exists a positive number ~0, a randomized action map 2, an 
initial distribution po, a transition law p, and a plan n in (S, A, 2, p,g) such that for 
every Markov plan 7? in (S, A, 2, p, g), 
~ndf’it+dPn-Eu. 
For each s in S and each j such that 
such that 
~({a:}) = i and p({aj’}) = 
(4.11) 
1 <j < k, let 9(s, j) contain the single measure p 
if C$ # ay (or ~({a;}) = 1 if a; = ay). Also, if a = a; or a = a$’ and si+, # .sy+, let 
p({si+, )1&j, a) = i and p({s:l,l}lsJ,j,a) = i, (4.12) 
and if a = a: or a = a; and .sJ+, = sy+, let 
p({s~+,}I&La) = 1. (4.13) 
For j such that k <j d n, let .9(s, j) contain all those probability measures which give 
unit mass to either {a:.} or {$} or {a,‘}. 
Further, for each a in A, let 
p({s*}ls;_,,k - l,a) = p({s*}Is;_,,k - 1,~) = 1, 
let 
9 = {soqs, . . ‘Sk-_lak : Sj E {s~,.$‘}(O<jdk - 1) and aj E {a~,~~}(1 <j<k)}, 
and suppose that the initial distribution po satisfies 
Po(m = Pod = 4 (4.14) 
(or po({sh}) = 1 if sb = si). 
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Let 9(s*, k) = {p, v}, where 
p({a:+i)) = 4 and A{ai+,}) = 1 - 5 and ~({a:,,}) = 1. 
To create the plan n, observe that Eqs. (4.12)-(4.14) allow us to define the selec- 
tion rules 7ri,7t2,..., 71k-i so that each is Markov and so that for each q in 8, the 
P,-probability of the set {qs*-} is the same. We define the non-Markov selection rule 
71k so that for q in 6, 
nk(qs* ) = 
{ 
p if Sg(qsw’ I+ (1 - 0s(qsw3) 29(qsw2), 
v if Sg(qsw’) + (1 - <)g(qsw3) <g(qsw’). 
To finish the definition of rc, we define r&+i,r&+z,. . ., IT, in such a way that for i = 
1,2,3, respectively, after action uh,, is used at time k, the plan rc follows the single 
history wi from that time onward. Thus, for fixed i, each of the elements of {qs*wi : 
q E 5j) receives equal probability under P,. Notice that the “non-forking” nature of 
w1,w2, and w3 makes it possible to arrange the Markov selection rules Xj (k<j<n) in 
this way. If two paths wi and wi had split apart after moving in tandem for a while, 
then the definition of the selection rules would have been ambiguous. Let M be the 
number of (distinct) elements in the set 6. Then 
.I gdP,=$ c [rg(qs*w’) + (1 - 0g(qsw3 >I {q:ndv* ,=pI 
+ c 9(4s*w2) . 
1 
(4.15) 
{q:Q(qs*)=vl 
Now, let r? be a Markov plan in (&A, 9, p, g). It is only when j = k and Sj = s* 
that the transition probability p(. Isj, j, a) depends on the action a. Thus, it is only when 
j = k and sj = s* that the definition of tij is an issue. Furthermore, since 3 is Markov, 
either we have 
72.&s*) = \, for all q in (S x A)k-’ (4.16) 
or 
;k(qs*) = /t for all q in (S x A)k-l. (4.17) 
Now, because of Eqs. (4.16), (4.17) and (4.15) we conclude that there exists EO > 0 
which satisfies the desired inequality (4.11). ??
5. Functions having the general linear sections property 
The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate the next theorem, which gives 
an exact characterization of those payoff functions which have the GLSP. It follows 
from Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.7 that all such functions are Markov-achievable. 
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Theorem 5.1. The payofs function g : H,, + R has the GLSP if and only if there 
exist mappings 
u, : S x A x S + R, i = l,...,n 
and 
v,:SXAXS+[O,CG), ,j=l,..., n-l 
such that for each element sOalsl a,s, of H,,, 
(5.1) 
Of course, the condition in the theorem above includes the standard additive utility 
payoff of classical dynamic programming (see Example 2.6). It also includes the usual 
finite-stage multiplicative utility models. Multiplicative utilities were used by Howard 
and Matheson (1972) and by Rothblum (1984). Payoff functions which arise from 
neither additive nor multiplicative utilities, or their limits, are sometimes referred to as 
“non-standard”. Several such non-standard optimality criteria are discussed by White 
(1993). Another different, but yet natural, criterion is used by Feinberg and Shwartz 
(1995). 
The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 3.9 and formulates the general linear 
sections property (Definition 2.5) in terms of slope and y-intercept: 
Lemma 5.2. The payoflfunction g : H, --f If8 has the GLSP if and only if for each 
k (1 d k dn - l), there exist bounded mappings xk : Hk + [0, oo), bk : Hk + [w, and 
Yk : Hn_k + [w such that for each q in (S x A)k, each s in S, and each w in (A x S)nek, 
g(qsw) = ak(qs)?‘k(s”“) + bk(qs). (5.2) 
Proof. Immediate from Definitions 2.3 and 2.5. 0 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Suppose g has the GLSP. Then by Lemma 5.2, for each k 
(1 <k d n - 1) there exist functions Cxk : Hk i [0, co), flk : Hk + @ Yk : Hn-k + iw 
(for each Sk E S, Yk(Sk-) is not constant) such that for each soalsl . ..a.~, E H,,, 
g(s0al ’ s,) = mk(sOal ’ ’ ‘Sk)Yk(Skak+l ‘&d f bk(SOal . ‘Sk). (5.3) 
Define ~1, q , and U, on HI by 
Ul = BI, vi = El, and u, = yn_i. (5.4) 
Now, suppose m satisfies 2 <m <II - 1, and let s be an arbitrary element of S. If for 
each q in (S x A)+‘, cc,_1 (qs) = 0, then for each a in A and each y in S, let 
u,(saJ~) = u&say) = 1; 
if there exists q* in (S x .4)“-’ such that a,_l(q*s) # 0, let 
u 
m 
(sayj = Pd4*sw) - Bm-1(4*s) 
%l(q*s) (5.5) 
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and 
v 
m 
(suy) = adq*suy) 
G-l(q*s)’ (5.6) 
We must show that these definitions of u, : HI + R and U, : HI + [O,cm) do 
not depend on q*. To do so, suppose q’ E (S x A)m-’ and q” E (S x A)m-l with 
a,_, (q’s) # 0 and c(,_~(q”s) # 0. Now, let 
A, = 
A, = 
v, = 
and 
V, = 
%(q”s~Y) 
b-1(4’s) 
Bm(d~~Y) - Pm- 1(q’s) 
am-1(q's) ’ 
Pdd’SQY) - Pm-IW.9; 
&I-1(4's) 
We will show that ni = L& and v, = v,. 
If q E (S x A)“-’ and w E (A x S)n--m, Eq. (5.3) gives 
g(qsayw) = 47-l(q~)Ym-l(ww) + Pm-I(@> 
and 
S(PUYW) = 67z(q~~Yh(Yw) + MWY). 
Thus for q = q’ (with i = 1) and for q = q” (with i = 2), we have 
Ym-l(Jayw) = k&w) + Vi. 
BY Eq. (5.7), 
(5.7) 
0 = (Al - ~z>hW> + (77, - 0,). 
Since w is arbitrary, and since y,(y-) is not constant, we must have ni = A, and 
vi = v,, as desired. Therefore, the functions u, and v, are well defined. 
To begin to prove Eq. (5.1) let 
@ = {k: 1 dk<n - l,a~(saui ...,sk) = 0). 
Assume temporarily that @ is non-empty, and let M be its smallest element. Then 
because of Eq. (5.3) we get 
g(so4 . . .&t) = Pd~O~l . . .shf) (5.8) 
and because of Eq. (5.6), for 1 <k,<M - 1, we have 
I? Uj(Sj_,UjSj) = cIk(SOU1 ’ + ‘Sk) # 0, (5.9) 
j=l 
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and 
(5.10) 
Then from Eqs. (5.4), (5.5), (5.9), and (5.10), it follows that 
By Eq. (5.8), these expressions are equivalent to g(sOal . s,, ), and thus Eq. (5.1) holds 
when @ is non-empty. 
On the other hand, if @ is empty, then Eq. (5.9) holds for each k (1 <k <n - 1). 
Therefore, 
n-1 n-l i-l 
= u1(soaI.q) + u,(s,_lans,) n Uj(Sj-IajSj) + C ui(Si-IWi) n ~j’i(sj-lajsj) 
j=l i=2 
= Bt(~oalsl>+r,-~(s,-la,s,)a,-l(soal ...S,-I) 
n-l 
+ C [Bi(soal . . .Sj) - j?_l(SoUl ” .Sj_1)] 
i=2 
= cI,_1(sOa, .. .~,-i)~~~l(~,-~a,s,)+p,-~(soal ...s,-I) 
j=l 
= g(sOal . . . 3,). 
This completes the proof of Eq. (5.1). 
Conversely, if for each sOal . . ‘s,, in H,, Eq. (5.1) holds, then for 1 <k<n - 1, let 
let 
and for 26kGn - 1, let 
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let 
Yn-I = un 
and for 1 <k<n - 2, let 
yk(skak+l ’ ’ .s,) = uk+l(sOalsI) + 2 ui(si-la&) c uj(sj-lajsj). 
i=k+2 j=l 
Then for each k (16kdn - l), 
g(s0al . . ‘S,)=Clk(sOal”‘sk)yk(skak+I “‘%+fik(sOal “‘Sk). 
Therefore, by Lemma 5.2, g has the GLSP. 0 
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